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Abstract  
This paper examines the 2013 Australian federal election to test two competing 
models of vote choice: spatial politics and valence issues. Using data from the 2013 
Australian Election Study, the analysis finds that spatial politics (measured by party 
identification and self-placement on the left-right spectrum) and valence issues both have 
significant effects on vote choice. However, spatial measures are more important than 
valence issues in explaining vote choice, in contrast with recent studies from Britain, 
Canada and the United States. Explanations for these differences are speculative, but may 
relate to Australia’s stable party and electoral system, including compulsory voting and the 
frequency of elections. The consequently high information burden faced by Australian 
voters may lead to a greater reliance on spatial heuristics than is found elsewhere. 
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Valence and Spatial Explanations for Voting 
 in the 2013 Australian Election 
Early theories of electoral behaviour relied on spatial explanations, with voters 
placing themselves at different positions on the ideological spectrum, and choosing a party 
that occupies a position closest to them. This approach, associated with the work of 
Anthony Downs (1957), has dominated electoral research for more than half a century. 
More recently, valence theories of voting have become popular. In this view, voters do not 
differ on their goals, but instead vote for a party that they judge will be most competent in 
meeting these goals if elected to office. Valence voting has since been widely promoted as 
an explanation for electoral change, especially in Britain (Bale, 2006; Clarke et al, 2009, 
2011; Green, 2007), as well as in the US and Canada (Clarke, Kornberg and Scotto, 2010). 
This paper evaluates these two theories in the context of the 2013 Australian election.  
The 2013 election was the culmination of one of the most turbulent periods in recent 
Australian politics. The 2010 election had resulted in the first hung parliament since 1940, 
forcing Labor to rely on the support of one Green member and three of four independent 
MPs. In addition, Labor was subjected to continuous leadership speculation, with repeated 
attempts to replace Julia Gillard with her precedessor, Kevin Rudd; these attempts finally 
succeeded just prior to the 2013 election. The 2013 election was also distinctive because 
the government announced the election date fully eight months in advance (although it was 
later changed by Rudd). And not least, the government was faced with major policy 
challenges, with stated Labor positions on balancing the budget, asylum seekers and a 
mining tax having to be substantially modified or reversed during the life of the 
government. 
An analysis of the dynamics of political choice in the 2013 election represents an 
ideal opportunity to test rival models of electoral choice, since all of the major elements—
policy issues, economic competence, leadership, campaign dynamics and partisanship—
were at the forefront of political discussion. In particular, the leadership changes within 
Labor permit us to make a better test of the impact of leadership traits on the vote than was 
the case in the 2010. This paper uses the 2013 Australian Election Study (AES) survey to 
test these rival models, and also places the results in the context of long-term changes in 
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voting behaviour measured by earlier AES surveys.i The first section examines the two 
main theories of voting, spatial and valence, while the second section examines the events 
leading up to the election campaign and the campaign itself. The third section covers the 
result of the election. The fourth section evaluates the two explanations for voting in the 
2013, while the final section places the findings within a comparative perspective. 
Theories of Voting 
Spatial Theories of Voting 
Spatial theories of voting assume that voters adopt differing ideological positions, 
and vote for the party that is closest to their own position. Party identification and policy 
issues represent the mechanisms by which spatial voting operates, by means of voters 
using partisanship as an informal short cut, and by taking positions on policy issues that 
broadly fall along a left-right alignment. Spatial theories therefore assume that parties 
compete for votes within an electorate that is primarily issue-oriented, and in which both 
parties and voters have full information and voters can transfer their votes freely. Of 
course, such conditions are rarely, if ever, met so that spatial theories are frequently subject 
to criticism and revision because of their unreasonable assumptions (see, for example, 
Adams, 2001; Budge et al, 2001). 
In the absence of full information, voters use short cuts to make their voting decision, 
with party identification being one of the primary means of reducing voters’ information 
burden. Partisanship has long dominated explanations for voting behaviour in the US, 
Britain and many European countries (for recent reviews, see Bartels, 2008; Holmberg, 
2007; Mair, 2007). However, since the 1980s the theory of spatial voting has been seen to 
be less relevant due to continuing partisan dealignment across a range of countries (Dalton 
and Wattenberg, 2000), the declining ability of left-right ideology to shape the vote 
(Sanders, 1999), and an apparent convergence in the policy positions of the major parties 
(Endersby and Galatas, 1998). While partisanship remains a major explanation for voting 
(and with it, the spatial theory of voting), it is less important than it once was. 
Explanations for Australian voting behaviour have likewise focused on spatial 
theories of voting, exemplified by party identification, although there remains debate about 
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the optimum placement of party identification within any model (Goot, 2013; McAllister, 
2009). In one of the earliest studies of Australian voting behaviour, Don Aitkin (1982: 1) 
stressed the importance of party identification in Australian voting, seeing the stability of 
politics as resting on ‘the adoption, by millions of Australians then and since, of relatively 
unchanging feelings of loyalty to one or other of the Australian parties.’ In later studies, 
others have reached similar conclusions about the central role of partisanship in shaping 
voter preferences (McAllister, 1992). Studies have also highlighted the changing role of 
issues, emphasizing the pivotal role of the economy in deciding electoral outcomes and, in 
particular, how economic performance was central to the success of the Howard Liberal 
government between 1996 and 2007 (Goot and Watson, 2007). 
Valence Theories of Voting 
In contrast to voters adopting different policy positions, valence politics refers to the 
issues that voters agree upon, such as increasing economic growth or maintaining an 
effective health care system. First proposed by Stokes (1963) as an alternative to spatial 
models of voting, the valence model emphasizes not the issue itself, since there is 
consensus that the outcome is desirable, but rather which party or leader is most competent 
to achieve the outcome. As Mueller (2003: 40) puts it, valence identifies issues on which 
‘all voters agree that more is better than less.’ The model therefore has implications for, 
among other things, leader images, since it is particular personalities that are evaluated by 
voters as being most competent (Bean, 1993; McAllister, 2007). 
In contrast to most of the other advanced democracies, there are no studies in 
Australia that have explicitly examined valence voting. Studies have examined the role of 
the economy (see, for example, Goot and Watson, 2007; McAllister, 2011: 172ff) or 
leaders (see Bean, 1993; Bean and Mughan, 1989); both are often considered to be aspects 
of valence. However, no Australian study has evaluated the utility of valence explanations 
for voting as against spatial explanations. This is in contrast to Britain, where numerous 
studies have evaluated the relative merits of the two approaches (see, for example, Clarke 
et al, 2009, 2011; Green, 2007). The results of British analyses overwhelmingly find that 
valence models are superior to spatial models in explaining voting behavior. Similar 
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studies of valence politics from Europe (Clark, 2009), the US and Canada (Clarke et al, 
2010a) largely support these conclusions. 
Election campaigns represent an ideal event in which to test competing theories of 
voting. Campaigns concentrate voters’ views about the issues, the leaders and the parties. 
A campaign highlights which party and leader will be the most competent in meeting 
goals, and they often compete with one another on that basis. It can reinforce previously 
held views, thus producing no change; alternatively, change may occur as a consequence 
of unexpected events or new information, and via the information flow that comes from the 
mass media (Brady, Johnston and Sides, 2006; Druckman and Parkin, 2005; Hillygus and 
Jackman, 2003). Parties may also approach the campaign in different ways, targeting 
voters to exert maximum influence on the outcome (Karp, Banducci and Bowler, 2008; 
Rohrschneider, 2002). The net effect is that the election campaign becomes a prism 
through which voters view the issues, the leaders and the parties. 
The 2013 Election Campaign 
The prime minister, Julia Gillard, announced in January 2013 that the election would 
be held on 14 September, the first time since federation that the date of a national election 
had been known so long in advance. However, when Kevin Rudd replaced Gillard as 
prime minister in late June he made it clear that he would not be bound by her decision and 
he eventually opted for holding the election a week earlier (ostensibly to avoid conflict 
with the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur). In theory, announcing the election date over six 
months in advance was intended to end uncertainty and allow the government to continue 
with its legislative program, freed from continuous election speculation. In practice, 
however, the announcement focused voters’ minds on the looming election and the 
necessity of making an electoral decision. More importantly for the Labor Party, it had the 
secondary effect of highlighting the latent leadership tensions between Gillard and Rudd.   
With an election date in place, Rudd and his supporters were able to work to a 
timeline in returning him to the prime ministership (Hartcher, 2013). A series of poorly 
received decisions by Gillard during the subsequent ‘long campaign’ dented her already 
waning popularity. By March 2013, opinion polling predicted that the government would 
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be defeated in a ‘landslide’ (Jones, 2013). With Rudd’s supporters convinced of the need 
to change leaders, Gillard was unable to withstand the internal momentum against her and 
Rudd took the leadership back from her on 26 June with a majority of 57 to 45 among 
Labor Party MPs.  The views of voters—including telephone survey data collected 
between 9 and 23 July 2013 (McAllister, 2013)—about these two leadership changes are 
shown in Table 1.  In 2010 a large majority disapproved of the leadership change. 
However, in 2013, Gillard’s unpopularity combined with Labor’s poor performance in the 
polls contributed to stronger support for the leadership change. Nevertheless, a majority 
still disapproved of the change. Labor therefore went to the polls having experienced an 
unprecedented period of leadership turmoil, and with the wounds of leadership division 
largely unhealed. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Party Support 2010-2013 
Throughout the 2010 to 2013 period, the Liberal-National coalition remained 
consistently ahead of Labor in the opinion polls (Figure 1).ii Labor support reached its 
nadir in mid-2011, when it trailed the coalition by up to 20 percentage points. Labor 
fortunes gradually improved during 2012, for three reasons. First, the February leadership 
vote between Gillard and Rudd resulted in a decisive win for Gillard, by 71 votes to 
Rudd’s 31; the issue of a Rudd succession appeared to be over. Second, in August the 
government reintroduced the ‘Pacific Solution’, with asylum seekers being sent to Nauru 
and Papua New Guinea to have their refugee claims assessed. This policy had been 
introduced by the Howard Liberal government in 2001; Labor’s dismantling of the 
program in 2008 had resulted in a substantial increase in asylum seekers arriving by boat 
(Phillips and Spinks, 2013). Third, on 9 October Gillard gave an impassioned speech in 
parliament accusing Abbott of misogyny; video of her speech went viral on social media, 
recording over one million views in one week alone. 
Late 2012 represented the peak in Labor popularity; thereafter it declined. On 20 
December Wayne Swan, the treasurer, announced that the budget would be in deficit, thus 
breaking a key plank in Labor’s 2010 election platform. On 21 March 2013 Gillard called a 
leadership ballot in which Rudd did not stand, and Gillard and her deputy, Wayne Swan, 
 8 
were returned unopposed. Labor popularity continued to decline before bottoming in mid-
2013, when Labor trailed the Coalition by almost 20 percentage points. Following Rudd’s 
return to the leadership in June, Labor’s support in the polls immediately increased. Even 
at that time, however, the government remained around 10 percentage points behind the 
coalition, and quickly lost approximately half of the advantage gained by the leadership 
change.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
Leaders’ Popularity 
Gillard and Abbott were two of the least popular party leaders in recent Australian 
political history. Figure 2 shows how far Gillard’s popularity declined throughout 2011, 
recovering only gradually in 2012 with that of her party’s fortunes. However, in only two 
short periods—in late 2010/early 2011 and late 2012—was she ahead of Tony Abbott. 
Indeed, in the three months leading up to her replacement by Kevin Rudd she trailed 
Abbott as preferred prime minister by an average of 7 percentage points. When Rudd 
replaced Gillard, he immediately led Abbott as preferred prime minister. However, Rudd’s 
lead was short-lived, and in the two subsequent months his popularity declined rapidly as 
he introduced confusing and poorly received policies on, among other things, development 
of the Northern Territory and the relocation of Sydney’s naval base to Brisbane (Hartcher, 
2013).  By contrast, Abbott’s popularity rose over the same period. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
The public’s views of a leader’s integrity and leadership capacity are the most 
commonly measured components of overall leadership evaluations (Goren, 2002).  These 
measures originated in survey research from the United States, and there is a debate over 
their relevance to parliamentary systems such as Australia (Goot, 2013).  ‘Effectiveness’ 
has been shown as the most important trait among leaders in Australia (Bean and Mughan, 
1989); without a similarly broad measure available, integrity and leadership are used here 
to measure two attitudes closely related to effectiveness. 
The extent to which the continuous leadership speculation following Rudd’s ousting 
in 2010 affected the standings of both Gillard and Rudd on these vital dimensions is 
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demonstrated in Table 2. When Rudd stood against John Howard in 2007, 72 percent of 
voters considered Rudd to be honest and 66 percent considered him to be trustworthy. By 
2013, when Rudd finally replaced Gillard, these proportions had halved. There are 
comparable collapses in public views of Rudd as an effective leader. These are dramatic 
changes in the public’s view of Rudd and can only be accounted for by Labor’s constant 
leadership maneuverings.iii At the same time, Tony Abbott’s standing with the electorate 
on integrity and leadership—not high to begin with—actually increased marginally 
between 2010 and 2013, which crucially put him ahead of Rudd.  
[Table 2 about here] 
The Leaders’ Debate 
The leaders’ debate has become a standard election event and has been held 
continuously since 1990 (Senior, 2008). Three debates were held during the 2013 
campaign, on 11, 21 and 27 August, respectively. In addition, a debate was held between 
the treasurer, Chris Bowen, and the shadow treasurer, Joe Hockey, on 27 August. The AES 
measured exposure to the first of the three leaders’ debates, when just 32 percent of the 
electorate reported that they had watched it. This was the lowest proportion watching a 
debate so far recorded; in 2010 the same proportion (for one debate) was 47 percent. 
Among those who watched the debate, Table 3 shows that opinions were almost equally 
divided, with 36 percent believing that Rudd won and 37 percent that Abbott won; just 
over one in four thought that the two leaders were about equal in their performances.  This 
division reflects published opinion polling from the campaign period, which saw Abbott 
win the first debate, Rudd perform strongly in the second debate only to be overshadowed 
by media criticism of his temperament, and a large number of ‘undecided’ respondents 
overall (Holmes, 2014). 
[Table 3 about here] 
Labor remained consistently behind the Liberal-National coalition in the polls in the 
period leading up to the 2013 election. Much of this can be attributed to Julia Gillard’s 
inability to overcome the controversial circumstances in which she replaced Kevin Rudd. 
For many voters, she was regarded as an illegitimate leader, as Table 1 has already 
illustrated. However, once Rudd finally replaced Gillard, he too became fatally tainted by 
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the continuous leadership speculation and he actually trailed Abbott on the key areas of 
integrity and strong leadership, previously some of his strongest attributes. Nor did the 
leadership debates work in Labor’s favour, with the voters declaring the first debate a 
draw. 
The Election Result 
The result of the election gave the Liberal-National coalition a total of 90 seats in the 
150-seat House of Representatives, compared to Labor’s 55 seats. Three minor parties—
the Greens, the Palmer United Party and Katter’s Australian Party—won one seat each, 
and two independents were also elected. On a two-party preferred vote, the coalition won 
53.5 percent of the vote, and Labor 46.5 percent. While the Coalition gained 18 seats in the 
lower house, Labor’s two-party preferred vote dropped by only 3.4 percent compared to 
2010. Indeed, the result was not as catastrophic for Labor as some had feared; opinion 
polls during the first half of 2013 had suggested that Labor might lose up to 35 seats (see, 
for example, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2013). From this perspective, the 
replacement of Gillard with Rudd did appear to have ‘saved the furniture’ as some have 
subsequently claimed (Hawker, 2013: 3). 
[Table 4 about here] 
Placing the turnover of the inter-election vote in a longer-term perspective shows the 
scale of the defections from Labor in 2013 (Table 4). Of those who voted for Labor in 
2010, one in three subsequently defected from the party in 2013, with about half going to 
the coalition, and a substantial number to minor party candidates.iv Placing this in the 
context of the 2007 and 2010 elections shows that Labor has been retaining a declining 
proportion of its voters. In 2010, Labor retained 72 percent of its 2007 voters, and in 2007, 
89 percent of its 2004 voters. This decline in voter loyalty to Labor is also reflected in the 
proportion of Labor partisans who voted for the party; in 2013, 76 percent of Labor 
partisans voted for the party, compared to 84 percent in 2010 and 91 percent in 2007. By 
contrast, the coalition has performed consistently better in recent elections in retaining 
voters from the preceding election as well as those who identify with the party, gaining the 
vote of 91 percent of its partisans in 2013, 94 percent in 2010 and 92 percent in 2007.  
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While the result of the 2013 election was not as catastrophic as the polls in the 
months leading up to the election seemed to indicate, the underlying patterns suggest that 
Labor suffered major defections among its longer-term supporters. These defections 
occurred both among those who voted for it in 2010 and, more strikingly, among its 
partisans. We have already speculated about some of the reasons for these defections, 
including Labor’s leadership changes and its numerous policy failures during the 2010-13 
period. In the next section we systematically test these hypotheses in order to explain the 
outcome of the 2013 election, and place these explanations within the context of the spatial 
and valence theories of voting. 
Evaluating the Explanations 
The valence and spatial explanations of voting lead to different predictions about the 
way in which voters reach their party choice. The valence model implies that voters agree 
about what they want a government to do; their choice is shaped by which party they 
believe will be most likely to deliver the desired outcome (Stokes, 1963: 373; Clarke et al, 
2011: 238).  The model also implies that voters will evaluate the qualities of the party 
leaders based on their perceived ability to meet these goals. Finally, since all agree on the 
importance of economic performance, the valence model predicts that the economy will 
improve in the future, and that government will have a positive effect on future economic 
performance (see, for example, Clarke et al, 2011: 244). By contrast, the spatial model 
assumes that voters will position themselves within an ideological space, and choose the 
party that is closest to their own ideological position (Stokes, 1963).  This is expressed in 
party identification, namely, the attachment a voter feels to one party and which acts as a 
shortcut in their voting decision (Campbell et al., 1960: ch. 7).   
As in all recent Australian national elections, there were different views among the 
public on the major issue in the 2013 election campaign (Table 5). When asked which 
issue was most important, management of the economy emerged as the top ranked issue, 
mentioned by just over one in four of the respondents, up from one in five in the 2010 
election. Health and Medicare ranked second in importance, mentioned by just under one 
in five, and education was mentioned by 15 percent of the respondents. The remaining 
issues attracted one in 10 mentions or less. The absence of a single dominating issue 
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largely reflects the narrative of the 2010-13 Labor government, with a range of policy 
issues—notably the carbon tax, asylum seekers, and health and education—emerging to 
occupy public debate for a short period and then fading away. 
[Table 5 about here] 
The second part of Table 5 shows which party respondents believed was best able to 
handle each of the 10 issues. Labor emerges as the preferred party on five of the issues, 
and the Liberal-Nationals on the remaining five. The coalition is the preferred party—by 
almost two to one—to manage the economy, but Labor leads decisively on health and 
education, also by a considerable margin. The largest party gap on all 10 issues is on the 
contentious issue of refugees and asylum seekers, with the coalition leading Labor as the 
preferred party by 22 percentage points. The last line of Table 5 shows that party 
preferences were relatively evenly matched, with a slight (5 percentage point) advantage to 
the coalition across the full range of issues.  
In addition to measuring the party judged most competent to deal with the first and 
second mentioned issues, the valence model also takes into account leader traits. These are 
defined as competence, integrity and leadership, operationalised by the items in Table 3.  
While leader ‘thermometer’ ratings are commonly used to operationalize views on leaders, 
it is not possible to control for those ratings in addition to leader traits since they are 
strongly correlated.  Trait measures are employed here to better capture the 
multidimensional nature of leadership evaluations. The correlations between the items used 
to make up the three scales are as follows: ‘competence’ comprises ‘intelligent’ and 
‘knowledgeable’ (Rudd: r = .73, Abbott: r = .76); ‘integrity’ comprises ‘honest’ and 
‘trustworthy’ (Rudd: r = .80, Abbott: r = .86); ‘leadership’ comprises ‘strong leader’ and 
‘sensible’ (Rudd: r = .66, Abbott: r = .65).  
The main event that assists voters to assess the personalities of the leaders and their 
ability to deal with the issues facing the country is the leaders’ debate (\Holbrook, 1999). 
Accordingly, we include a measure for whether the respondent thought had Rudd or 
Abbott had won the debate.  While there are limitations to such a measure on its own—
primarily the decline in televised debate audiences in recent years and concerns about the 
accuracy of recalling evaluations some weeks after the event (Prior, 2012)—here it 
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complements the leadership evaluation scales to provide a more valid measure.  Finally, 
three measures are included for an assessment of the country’s economy compared with 
one year ago (i.e. a retrospective assessment), expected economic performance in one 
year’s time (i.e. prospective), and for the impact of the government on future economic 
performance.  
The spatial explanation for voting is represented by partisanship, measured by 
whether the respondent reported that they were a Labor or a Liberal-National partisan, and 
by their placement on the left-right scale. In addition, two measures of economic 
collectivism versus economic individualism are included: whether the respondent thought 
that more should be spent on social services rather than on providing a tax cut; and 
whether or not the respondent thought that income and wealth should be redistributed. 
These measures represent the long-standing divide between business and labour (Wilson 
and Breusch, 2003).  
The two models are evaluated by estimating a regression model using the variables 
defined above to predict the Labor versus the Liberal-National vote. The variables falling 
within each of the two models, together with their scoring and means and standard 
deviations, are shown in the Appendix Table. The results in Table 6 show that the 
predominant effects on the vote are partisanship and the party judged to be best able to 
handle the respondent’s most important issues, with partisanship being about twice as 
important as issue proximity. Among the other spatial factors, none reaches statistical 
significance. Among the other valence factors, leader traits matter. In particular, 
assessments of both leaders’ integrity have a significant influence on the vote, net of 
other things. Assessment of leadership matters for Abbott, but not for Rudd. There is also 
a minor effect for expectations about the government’s impact on the economy in the 
coming year. 
[Table 6 about here] 
Based on the coefficients presented in this table, spatial explanations for the vote in 
the 2013 election appear more important than valence explanations. However, the 
differences are not large. In fact, if we allocate the variance explained by the full 
model—69 per cent—according to the weights of the independent variables, the 11 
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valence variables account for 39 per cent of the total variance, while the four spatial 
variables account for 30 per cent of the variance. The calculation is made by summing 
the standardized (beta) coefficients for the two categories of variables, and then 
apportioning the variance explained by the model to each of the two. In simpler terms, 
the ‘r squared’ figure on the model – .69 – can be interpreted as showing that 69 percent 
of variation on the dependent variable can be explained by the independent variables in 
the model; conversely, that 31 percent of that variation is either random or the result of 
other, unmeasured factors. Within that 69 percent, we can show – using the standardized, 
or ‘within model’, coefficients – the relative predictive powers of the spatial and valence 
factors. In the next section we place this finding in longitudinal and comparative 
perspective. 
Discussion 
The 2013 Australian election saw the Labor government defeated after six years in 
office, replaced by a Liberal-National party coalition led by Tony Abbott. The election 
came after several years of constant leadership speculation within the Labor government, 
with Kevin Rudd deposing Julia Gillard as party leader and prime minister just three 
months before the election. Gillard, Rudd and Abbott each attracted historically low levels 
of personal support among voters. A plurality of voters listed economic management as 
their most salient election issue, an obvious weak point for Labor because of its record of 
relative policy failure. The result was a large defection of Labor voters to the Liberal-
National coalition, the Greens and to minor parties. 
The purpose of this paper has been to test two main alternative theories—valence 
and spatial—as explanations for voting in the 2013 election. Our analysis of the 2013 AES 
shows that party identification—a measure of spatial politics—is substantially more 
important than valence issues in explaining the 2013 election result. In addition, the results 
of a longitudinal analysis from 1990 to 2013, shown in Figure 3, confirms that spatial 
politics are consistently more important than valence issues, even after a wide range of 
other factors are taken into account. In each of the nine elections analyzed in Figure 3, the 
combined impact of the first and second mentioned issue on the vote is easily surpassed by 
partisanship. The dominance of partisanship was exceptionally strong in the 1993 election, 
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which witnessed a divisive campaign between an incumbent Labor government led by an 
unpopular leader, Paul Keating, and a Liberal Party proposing radical changes to tax, 
health and industrial relations policies. In that election, partisanship was almost three times 
more important than issues in determining the vote. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
The findings of this study, while important in helping to explain the outcome of the 
2013 election result, also have substantial comparative implications. Why have valence 
issues had less resonance in Australia than in comparable countries, such as Britain, 
Canada and the US, where valence has consistently grown in importance over the past 
three decades (see, for example, Clarke et al, 2009, 2010a; Green 2007)? Australian voters 
have clearly defied electoral trends evident in those systems. Two factors may be at work 
to set Australia apart. First, Australia maintains a strong, disciplined party system, 
including high and stable levels of party identification, in contrast to similar systems 
elsewhere (Mackerras and McAllister, 1999; McAllister, 2011). The 2013 AES shows that 
71 percent of voters were either ‘fairly’ or ‘very strong’ party identifiers, compared with 
57 percent of British voters in 2010 (Clarke et al., 2010b). Almost half of all voters in the 
2013 AES have always voted for the same party and 45 percent said that they had decided 
how to vote ‘a long time’ before the campaign commenced. Placed in a comparative 
perspective, party support in Australia is strong and remarkably stable.  
Australia’s electoral system, combining compulsory voting and frequent elections, 
constitutes a second explanation. Compulsion increases the informational burden on 
voters; to compensate, voters rely more heavily on shortcuts such as party identification, 
leadership perceptions and party images (Popkin, 1994). Compulsory voting also helps to 
explain the high levels of party identification among Australian voters (McAllister, 2011; 
see also Singh and Thornton, 2013). Where citizens who would not otherwise vote are 
compelled to turn out and at the very least accept a ballot paper, it is also the case that they 
more readily draw on heuristics – most commonly party identification – in making 
electoral decisions. Where citizens choose to vote – the US, UK and Canada inclusive – it 
is unsurprising that voters are more likely to engage with issues during the electoral 
decision-making process, to maximize the utility of their vote. In compulsory systems, 
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utility maximization may in many cases be achieved simply by avoiding sanctions for 
abstention. Additionally, Australian voters face more frequent federal elections than British 
voters (every three years on average, compared with five year terms in Britain), in addition 
to state elections. Frequent voting combined with compulsory voting thus underpins strong 
partisan attachments among Australian voters, at the expense of valence politics.  Future 
research into valence explanations of voting behaviour should examine the variation in 
effects between systems, particularly by expanding the analysis of valence issues in 
compulsory voting systems. 
As the first analysis to compare valence and spatial explanations of Australian voting 
behaviour, we conclude that spatial politics dominate Australian electoral behaviour. In the 
context of the 2013 election, voters’ reliance on spatial politics meant that Labor was 
unable to overcome its combined problems of leadership instability and an absence of 
trust. Labor thus struggled to retain many of its core partisans. While the most salient issue 
nominated by voters does positively predict vote choice, party identification is almost 
twice as important. Other measures related to valence politics, including leadership and 
economic evaluations, have negligible effects in the model. With voters relying on their 
party identification, and to a lesser degree on their valence issue judgments, the Labor 
government was unable to retain power. To put it another way, the Liberal-National 
opposition did not need to present a popular leader to win the election; they simply needed 
voters to draw on their usual heuristics at the polling booth.  
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Table 1: Views of Labor’s Leadership Changes, 2010 and 2013 
 Gillard replaces 
Rudd, 2010 
Rudd replaces 
Gillard, 2013
 
(Change) 
Strongly approve 5 12 (+7) 
Approve 21 30 (+9) 
Disapprove 37 24 (-13) 
Strongly disapprove 37 34 (-3) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 100 100  
(N) (2,042) (1,075)  
Question: ‘Do you approve or disapprove of the way the Labor Party handled 
the leadership change in June of this year, when Julia Gillard (2013: Kevin 
Rudd) replaced Kevin Rudd (2013: Julia Gillard)? 
Sources 2010 Australian Election Study; 2013 ANUpoll. 
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Figure 1: Voting Intention, August 2010-September 2013 
 
Estimates are monthly averages. Question: ‘If the federal election for 
the House of Representatives was held today, which one of the 
following would you vote for? If uncommitted, to which one of these 
do you have a leaning?’ 
Source Newspoll.  
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Figure 2: Preferred Prime Minister, August 2010-September 2013 
 
Estimates are monthly averages. Question: ‘Who do you think would 
make the better Prime Minister?’ 
Source Newspoll 
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Table 2: Leadership Traits and Ratings, 2007-13 
 Gillard Rudd Abbott 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 2007 2010 2013 2007 2010 2013 2010 2013 
Integrity         
  Honest na 48 na 72 na 38 43 45 
  Trustworthy na 40 na 66 na 29 36 40 
Competence         
  Intelligent na 89 na 92 na 85 72 68 
  Knowledgeable na 80 na 82 na 80 59 58 
Leadership         
  Strong leader na 60 na 76 na 40 54 60 
  Sensible na 72 na 82 na 49 50 52 
Mean ratings (0-10) 5.2 4.9 4.0 6.3 5.0 4.1 4.3 4.3 
Questions: ‘Here is a list of words and phrases people use to describe party leaders.  Thinking first 
about [leader], in your opinion how well does each of these describe [him/her]—extremely well, 
quite well, not too well or not well at all?’ ‘Using a scale from 0 to 10, please show how much you 
like or dislike the party leaders.  If you don't know much about them, you should give them a rating 
of 5.’ Trait estimates are for percent who said ‘extremely’ or ‘quite’ well. Traits were only asked of 
the prime minister and opposition leader. 
Sources  2007, 2010 and 2013 AES. 
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Table 3: The 2013 Leaders’ Debate 
  
All 
Watched
debate 
Did not
watch 
Rudd much better 8 13 5 
Rudd somewhat better 21 23 20 
About equal 38 27 45 
Abbott somewhat better 25 26 24 
Abbott much better 8 11 6 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 100 100 100 
(N) (3,497) (1,357) (2,140) 
Questions: ‘Did you watch the televised debate between Kevin Rudd and 
Tony Abbott on Sunday 11 August?’ ‘From what you saw or what you 
heard or read about it, who do you think performed better in the debate—
Rudd or Abbott?’ 
Source 2013 Australian Election Study. 
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Table 4: The Turnover of the Vote, 2004-2013 
 Lab Lib-Nat Green Other Total (N) 
 (2013 Vote)   
2010 Vote       
  Lab 67 15 8 10 100 (1,425) 
  Lib-Nat 4 88 1 7 100 (1,443) 
 (2010 Vote)   
2007 Vote       
  Lab 72 15 12 1 100 (929) 
  Lib-Nat 7 89 3 1 100 (804) 
 (2007 Vote)   
2004 Vote       
  Lab 89 4 4 2 100 (530) 
  Lib-Nat 18 76 2 4 100 (875) 
Estimates are the current and recalled vote in the two elections in question. 
Sources 2007, 2010 and 2013 Australian Election Studies. 
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Table 5: Election Issues and Party Competence 
 Most important issue Party best able to handle issue 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Issues First Second Lab Lib-Nat No diff Total 
1.   Management of the economy 27 14 23 44 33 100 
2.   Health and Medicare 19 21 37 27 36 100 
3.   Education 15 15 43 25 32 100 
4.   Taxation 11 11 25 34 41 100 
5.   Refugee and asylum seekers 10 14 19 41 40 100 
6.   Environment 6 6 36 22 42 100 
7.   Carbon tax 4 6 32 42 26 100 
8.   Global warming 3 5 35 22 43 100 
9.   Industrial relations 3 4 31 30 39 100 
10. Immigration 2 4 21 37 42 100 
   (35) (40) (25) (100) 
Questions: ‘Here is a list of important issues that were discussed during the election campaign. ... 
Still thinking about the same 10 issues, which of these issues was most important to you and your 
family during the election campaign? And which next?’ ‘Still thinking about these same issues, 
whose policies—the Labor Party’s or the Liberal–National Coalition’s—would you say come 
closer to your own views on each of these issues?’ No difference combines no difference and 
don’t know. 
Source 2013 Australian Election Study. 
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Table 6: Valence and Spatial Explanations for the 2013 Vote 
 Labor vs Liberal-National vote 
 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 b beta (SE) 
Issues    
  First mentioned issue, prefers Labor .24* .25* (.02) 
  Second mentioned issue, prefers Labor .03 .03 (.02) 
Leader Traits    
  Rudd competence .01 .01 (.01) 
  Abbott competence -.00 -.00 (.01) 
  Rudd integrity .05* .09* (.01) 
  Abbott integrity -.03* -.07* (.01) 
  Rudd leadership .01 -.02 (.01) 
  Abbott leadership -.03* -.06* (.01) 
Rudd won leaders’ debate .02 .04 (.01) 
Economy    
  Country’s economy compared one year ago -.00 -.00 (.01) 
  Country’s economy better in one year .01 .02 (.01) 
  Government good effect on economy -.01 -.01 (.01) 
Partisanship and Ideology    
  Labor partisan .46* .46* (.02) 
  Left-right self-placement .00 .02 (.01) 
  Prefer more social services to tax cuts .01 .02 (.01) 
  Redistribute income and wealth .01 .02 (.01) 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    Adj R-squared .69   
    Constant .18   
    (N) (3,955)   
* statistically significant at p<.01 or better. 
Ordinary least squares regression analysis predicting the probability of a Labor versus a 
Liberal-National vote, coded 1 = Labor, 0.5 = other, 0 = Liberal or National. See Appendix 
Table for details of scoring of independent variables. 
Source 2013 Australian Election Study. 
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Figure 3: Electoral Effects of Valence and Spatial Measures, 1990-2013 
 
Estimates are partial regression coefficients, predicting vote, with other measures 
controlled for as defined by the model in Table 6. 
Sources 1990-2013 Australian Election Studies. 
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Appendix Table: Variables, Scoring, Means 
Variable Codes Mean SD 
Valence Variables    
  First mentioned issue, 
  prefers Labor 
1=yes, 0=no .47 .43 
  Second mentioned issue, 
  prefers Labor 
1=yes, 0=no .49 .42 
  Rudd competence 4=extremely well, 3=quite well, 
2=not too well, 1=not well at all 
3.06 .73 
  Abbott competence 1=extremely well, 3=quite well, 
2=not too well, 1=not well at all 
2.67 .84 
  Rudd integrity 4=extremely well, 3=quite well, 
2=not too well, 1=not well at all 
2.07 .86 
  Abbott integrity 4=extremely well, 3=quite well, 
2=not too well, 1=not well at all 
2.29 .95 
  Rudd leadership 4=extremely well, 3=quite well, 
2=not too well, 1=not well at all 
2.34 .82 
  Abbott leadership 1=extremely well, 3=quite well, 
2=not too well, 1=not well at all 
2.55 .83 
  Rudd won leader’s 
  debate 
5=Rudd did much better, 4=Rudd 
did somewhat better, 3=About 
equal, 2=Abbott did somewhat 
better, 1=Abbott did much better 
2.99 1.04 
  Country’s economy 
  compared one year ago 
5=A lot better, 4=A little better, 
3=About the same, 2=A little 
worse, 1=A lot worse  
2.55 1.00 
  Country’s economy 
  better in one year 
5=A lot better, 4=A little better, 
3=About the same, 2=A little 
worse, 1=A lot worse  
3.09 1.05 
  Government good effect 
  on economy 
3=A good effect, 2=Not much 
difference, 1=A bad effect 
1.77 .67 
Spatial Variables    
  Labor partisan 1=yes, 0=no .35 .48 
  Left-right self-placement 10=right, 0=left 5.03 2.27 
  Prefer more social 
  services to tax cuts 
5=Strongly favour spending more 
on social services, 4=Mildly 
favour, 3=Depends, 2=Mildly 
favour reducing taxes, 1=Strongly 
favour 
2.87 1.29 
  Redistribute income and 
  wealth 
5=Strongly disagree, 4=Disagree, 
3=Neither agree nor disagree, 
2=Agree, 1=Strongly agree 
2.60 1.09 
  (N)  (3,955)  
Source  2013 Australian Election Study. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
i  The 2013 Australian Election Study survey was a mail-out, mail-back survey of 
persons registered to vote in the 2013 election with the sampling frame supplied by 
the Australian Electoral Commission from the electoral rolls. There was also an 
online option for completion of the survey, which was used by a small number of 
respondents. The final response rate was 33.9 percent after four follow-ups. The 
survey was weighted to reflect the national electorate. Full details of the 2013 
survey, and of the earlier AES surveys, can be found in McAllister and Cameron 
(2013). 
ii  Figures 1 and 2 rely on Newspoll as their source, but the other polls conducted 
during the course of campaign come to similar conclusions. See Goot (2014). 
iii  The declines on the other traits are much smaller. For example, the proportion 
seeing Rudd as knowledgeable dropped by just 2 percentage points between 2007 
and 2013, and the proportion seeing him as intelligent declined by 7 percent. 
iv  In particular, support for the Palmer United Party, which attracted 5.5 percent of 
the first preference vote, was disproportionately composed of former Labor voters 
(50 percent of whom voted Labor in 2010, 20 percent coalition, and 30 percent 
were other/non voters. N=84).  
